Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War 1950-1953

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Although Anglo-American naval relations were close throughout the Korean War, these ties could be strained and frayed when U. Navy commanders operated as though the Royal Navy was a mirror image of their own fleet. This case study in managing multinational operations serves as a timely reminder for commanders and operators of the importance of understanding the history and organizational structure of their coalition partners and of being prepared to adjust practices and procedures based on this knowledge.

The experience of Rear Admiral George Dyer illustrates the dangers of mirror-imaging coalition allies, even those as close as the Royal Navy. Dyer brought a great deal of experience to his new command, having held several staff and surface warfare positions in both the Pacific and Atlantic during World War II.

Samenvatting

The first mission, west coast air and gunfire support, fell to Task Group Dyer entered his position with a firm conviction about the role of naval power in Korea. From his perspective, the UN was giving away too much at the talks and increasing the military pressure on the Communists might force them into greater concessions.


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For example, in an August letter, he approvingly wrote that daily his ships were firing —1, shells and his planes were dropping 10—25 tons of bombs. One Canadian officer described the U.

Coalition Air Warfare Korean War, 1950-1953

The lavish use of ammunition by the U. As the British naval advisor in Tokyo wrote in August , in the U. Navy] practicing such self-restraint in bombardment. Navy and U.

The U. Navy divided command functions into three separate lines of authority: operational, type, and logistics. An operational commander assigned missions and ordered ships and aircraft to perform specific missions. The type commander handled administrative tasks such as assigning personnel to a warship, ensuring training requirements were met, and scheduling repairs.

Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War, Proceedings Air Force - كتب Google

Logistics ships were set aside in a logistics force that reported to a logistics commander separate from the type and operational commanders. The purpose of this command structure was to free the operational commander from administrative and logistical responsibilities so that he could focus entirely on combat operations. The system also gave the commander maximum mobility and flexibility in operations, two characteristics that dominated operations in the Pacific theater in World War II. Although Task Force 95 commanders before and after Dyer also went to sea, Dyer did so more frequently.

This style of command caused two problems as far as Scott-Moncrieff and his staff were concerned.

First, Dyer was frequently not present at his headquarters at Sasebo in Japan, which limited his day-to-day contact with liaison officers from the Air Force, Army, intelligence, and other organizations. This reduction in daily contact led to lower levels of cooperation between Task Force 95 and the various other organizations involved in fighting the Korean War. Navy largely ran the war as it saw fit with minimal contact with organizations not under the control of Admiral Chester Nimitz at Pearl Harbor.


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But Korea was different. Air support required constant coordination and communication with the Army and Air Force, while raids and island defense missions needed to be coordinated with multiple intelligence organizations. If Dyer had been more accommodating to the British or pursued closer personal relations with Scott-Moncrieff, perhaps much of the acrimony could have been avoided. Other British naval officers found that close personal ties could bring considerable benefits in Korea. For example, relations at American naval headquarters in Tokyo between the U.

Navy staff and the British naval liaison officer stationed there remained close and harmonious throughout the war. The liaison officer, Commander John Gray, helped provide the Admiralty with insight on American naval thinking while providing information to the Americans about British capabilities and intentions. Need help? Partners MySchool Discovery.

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Uitgever: Smashwords Edition. Samenvatting Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this Air Force publication presents the proceedings of a commemorative symposium at the U. Congress on the Korean War. Sadly, of all the aspects of that little-appreciated conflict, perhaps the least appreciated of all is the air war. Indeed, with Korean veterans at last receiving just recognition of their accomplishments, it is remarkable to the degree that the Korean air war is the one aspect of the Korean War that continues to receive far less attention than it should.

For example, almost all the publicity surrounding the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War - and particularly the speeches of national figures on the June 25, kickoff at the Korean War Memorial - have stressed the struggle on the ground, with air power either escaping mention, or mentioned only as if it were some sort of sideshow.

In fact, even in terms of the land struggle, much of the commemoration has been cast in terms of the bitter fighting surrounding the retreats in the face of Chinese intervention in November-December , which was but one campaign in a war of many. Such a narrow focus makes as much sense as commemorating America's role in World War II in terms of only Bataan or Kasserine, without mentioning Normandy or the smashing of Japanese militarism, Italian fascism, or German Nazism.

Much of this ignoring of the air dimension may simply reflect the innate failure by many to appreciate how air power has transformed America's national security over the last century. The transformation has been so rapid that one feels it is often reflected more accurately by the popular perception of the average citizen than it is in official doctrinal thinking with its often-too-traditionalist and established hierarchy of hoary and questionable ''truths. In Korea, more often than not, it was the airmen of the U.

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